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The Lisbon Treaty and
External Relations
By Dr Simon Duke Dr Simon Duke Dr Simon Duke Dr Simon Duke Dr Simon Duke*
Some of the most profound and potentially far-fetching changes introduced into the Treaty of
Lisbon are to be found in the area of EU external relations. Although consensus for change was
already established at the Convention on the Future of Europe, the national sensitivity of foreign
and security policy has meant that the Treaty often does little more than sketch the broad outlines
leaving the details to be filled in at a later date. This contribution argues that the principal
challenges for EU external relations lie beyond ratification. It will be up to the Member States
and the EU institutions to imbue the new positions and practices introduced by the Treaty with
substance. Critically, this will mean defining the role of the (new) High Representative vis-à-vis
the other external relations actors; shaping the European External Action Service and the Union
delegations; and deciding how national diplomatic roles will complement those of the EU
institutions and vice versa. The security and defence related provisions of the Treaty will also have
to be implemented in a consensual manner. In short, the Lisbon Treaty holds enormous potential
for a more coherent Union on the international stage, but whether this is realised or not will
ultimately depend upon the Member States.
Implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU external Implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU external Implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU external Implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU external Implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU external
relations relations relations relations relations
The conclusions of the Convention on the Future of Europe’s
Working Group on External Action recognised the need for
the Union to “maximise its influence on the global stage”
by using “all its instruments, political and economic alike,
in a coordinated and mutual-
ly reinforcing manner”.1 Of
central importance to this
effort was the creation of a
position combining the
existing functions of the High
Representative for CFSP with
that of a Vice-President of
the Commission, responsible
for coordination of external
relations, as well as that of
chair of the Foreign Affairs
Council (FAC). It is thus not
correct to say, as is all too
common, that the new
position is simply a dual-
hatting of the current High
Representative’s role with
that of the Commissioner for
External Relations – it is more. The Working Group contented
itself with outlining a number of options regarding what
they then termed the “European External Representative”.
Although the institutional location and role of the (new)
High Representative became clearer in the subsequent
treaty drafting processes, it still begged a number of
The citizens of France and the Netherlands did not vote
against the Constitutional Treaty with external relations
specifically in mind. Indeed, successive public opinion polls
indicate the desire for more, not less, Europe in foreign and
security policy. The Lisbon Treaty introduces a number of
potentially far-reaching changes in EU external relations
with the scope for the Union to become a more coherent
actor on the international
stage. The scope of the
changes reflects the visions
of those working groups in
the Convention on the Future
of Europe who were pres-
cient enough to realise that
the Union had yet to reach
its full potential in these
areas.
This contribution will
briefly summarise the nature
of the key changes intro-
duced by the Treaty in
external relations and will
then focus upon some of the
potential challenges that lie
beyond ratification. Since
space prohibits a detailed
examination of all of the changes introduced in the external
relations area, the focus will be upon the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the
European External Action Service (EEAS), which shall assist
the former, the Union delegations and the Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
The Lisbon Treaty
introduces a number of
potentially far-reaching
changes in EU external
relations with the scope for
the Union to become a
more coherent actor on the
international stage.
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important questions such as how the High Representative
will balance his or her role with the triple Presidencies –
those of the European Council, the Council and the
Commission. These will be briefly reviewed since they are
essential to understanding the institutional context in which
the High Representative will have to operate.
The Treaty states that the President of the European
Council shall “at his or her level and in that capacity, ensure
the external representation of the Union on issues concerning
its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to
the powers of the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.2 The first and most
obvious problems are of “level” and “capacity” that may be
largely determined by the perception and self-image of the
first office holders. A declaration to the Final Act calls for the
choice of the three positions (High Representative and the
respective Presidents of the European Council and the
Commission) to “respect the geographical and demographic
diversity of the Union and its Member States” which,
although understandable, could give rise to the familiar
jockeying between the Member States. This, in turn, may
then influence relations between the three key positions. At
a more technical level, the absence of any specified
secretariat for the President of the European Council raises
the question of who, or what, will support this office? It also
raises the question of whether those departments that do
not fall under the European External Action Service (EEAS)
(discussed in more detail below) are then under the President
of the European Council? Might this also include the EU
Military Staff?
The rotating national Presidency of the Council applies
to all configurations of the Council with the exception of the
FAC, which shall fall under the new High Representative.3
The question then arises of what role the Presidency plays
in CFSP since under the current treaty arrangements this
has, arguably, been the main focus of successive
Presidencies. Under the Lisbon Treaty the delineation of
duties and competences between the FAC and the General
Affairs Council has yet to be specified, although the FAC is
clearly not limited solely to CFSP matters since they shall
also “elaborate the Union’s external action on the basis of
strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and
ensure that the Union’s action is consistent”.4 This has
implications for the Political and Security Committee (PSC),
which shall be chaired by a “representative of the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy”, whereas the Committee of Permanent Represent-
atives (Coreper) will be chaired “by a representative of the
Member State chairing the General Affairs Council”. This
gives rise to a number of questions such as who will
represent the Commission in the PSC and how the working
parties will be arranged and chaired. Presumably the
working parties in the current Community areas of external
relations (such as trade, development or enlargement) will
continue to be chaired by the rotating Presidency, whereas
the CFSP groups could be chaired by a member of the
EEAS, with an ad hoc determination applying where mixed
competences apply.
The new High Representative’s relations with the
Commission, including the President thereof, are also likely
to be challenging. The High Representative will be a Vice-
President in Commission but, unlike the other Vice-
Presidents, he is not appointed by the President of the
Commission but by the European Council, acting by
qualified-majority, with the agreement of the President of
the Commission. The High Representative shall be
“responsible within the Commission for responsibilities
incumbent upon it in external relations and for coordinating
other aspects of the Union’s external action”.5 This
immediately raises the question of what are those
Signing the Treaty of Lisbon
© European Communities, 1995-2008
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○EIPASCOPE 2008/1
15
T
h
e
 
L
i
s
b
o
n
 
T
r
e
a
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
“responsibilities” incumbent upon the Commission and
what are the “other aspects” that have to be coordinated.
The scope of the former could be indicated by the current
Group of Commissioners on External Relations, chaired by
the President of the Commission and the Commissioner for
External Relations as Vice-President (in other words, DG
External Relations including the Service responsible for
External Delegations; DG Trade; DG Development: DG
Enlargement: the EuropeAid Cooperation Office; ECHO;
and some external aspects of DG Economic and Financial
Affairs). These tasks would then be distinct from other
aspects of the Commission’s work with a bearing on
external relations, such as agriculture or the environment,
where the High Representative would have a coordination
role rather than direct responsibility. This question is of
more than passing interest to the European External Action
Service (see below) where considerable confusion exists
over which departments are “relevant” to the new Service
– the remit of the High Representative in this context will
therefore suggest the scope of relevance to the Service.
Given the extensive nature of the High Representative’s
responsibilities, the President
of the Commission would
presumably not chair any
revised external relations
group – although this re-
mains to be seen.
The High Representative’s
role in the Commission
context may also be com-
plicated by some more
mundane considerations,
such as whether it is possible to balance his or her
responsibilities and coordination roles within the
Commission, which demands a presence in Brussels, with
the demands of foreign representation in political dialogue
and at international conferences. This may not be an easy
balance, especially if the current High Representative’s
punishing travel schedule is any indication. The considerable
physical demands of the job makes the question of effective
support a critical issue and it is to this we now turn.
The European External Action Service The European External Action Service The European External Action Service The European External Action Service The European External Action Service
The EEAS is in many ways pivotal to the coherence and
effectiveness of future EU external relations. The degree to
which any High Representative will be able to function and
meet the demands made upon him or her will depend
primarily upon the Service. The Treaty specifies that the
EEAS will assist the High Representative and “shall work in
cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member
States and shall comprise officials from the relevant
departments of the General Secretariat of Council and of
the Commission as well as staff from national diplomatic
services of the Member States”.6 The key issues behind
which a multitude of turf sensitivities lie, are what are the
“relevant departments” and how seconded national
diplomats will be integrated?
Preparatory work on the Service has progressed in fits
and starts, commencing with the signature of the
Constitutional Treaty in October 2004, halting after the
respective French and Dutch referenda in May and June
2005, and recommencing more recently with the signing of
the Lisbon Treaty. Until this point progress had been made
in discussions between the parties on the legal status of the
EEAS, personnel issues, budgetary questions, administrative
aspects and the management of the Union delegations.
The Member States were consulted between 27-29 April
2005 (including Bulgaria and Romania) and a stocktaking
of these meetings took place in Coreper on 12 May. The
European Parliament also held a debate on the EEAS in
plenary session on 11 May and adopted a resolution on the
Service on 26 May. The resolution included the firm desire
to see the Service “incorporated, in organisations and
budgetary terms, in the Commission’s staff structure, while
the directorial powers of the Foreign Minister, who will also
be a Commission Vice-Presidency, should ensure that the
Service is bound in the “traditional” foreign policy sphere
(the CFSP and CSDP) by the decisions of the Council ... and
subject in the Community external relations sphere to the
decisions of the college of Commissioners”.7
Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, and
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European
Commission, were less emphatic than the European
Parliament in terms of the institutional locale of the Service,
preferring to describe the EEAS as sui generis in nature, in
their 2005 Joint Progress
Report. Hence, the Service
“would not be a new ‘insti-
tution’, but a service under
the authority of the Foreign
Minister, with close links to
both the Council and the
Commission”.8 The logic
underpinning the sui generis
formulation was in part to
minimise duplication and to
save costs, but also to provide the High Representative with
a framework in which he or she could rely on the assistance
of the EEAS as well as the support services of the Commission
and the Council. Less charitably, this formulation was
merely a reflection of earlier unresolved differences over
the composition and affiliation of the Service that emerged
from the Convention. The preference of the European
Parliament to incorporate the EEAS into the Commission’s
staff structures, the predictable opposition to this from a
number of Member States, alongside the lack of any
specific institutional reference in the Constitutional Treaty,
made the sui generis moniker preferable – but it solved few
of the underlying tensions.
The difference, albeit undefined, between responsibilities
within the Commission and the coordination of other
aspects of the Union’s external action, suggests two logical
options. The first, a minimalist model, would put the
emphasis on coordination and less on the direct
responsibilities of the High Representative, while the
maximalist version stresses responsibilities rather than
coordination.
Given the High Representative’s specific responsibilities
in the CFSP and CSDP areas, the minimalist model would
emphasise the ability to assist him or her in this domain.
Since the High Representative’s role does not preclude him
from drawing on other services within the Council Secretariat
and the Commission, the arguments could be made in
favour of a fairly small Service, complemented by seconded
national diplomats. The minimalist model would restrict the
EEAS to most of DG-E and the Policy Unit from the Council
Secretariat side and DG External Relations on the
Commission side, most notably Directorate A, or the “Crisis
Platform”, with responsibility for policy coordination in
The EEAS is in many ways
pivotal to the coherence
and effectiveness of future
EU external relations.
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CFSP. In this case, the self-exemption of trade from the
EEAS discussions on the grounds of exclusive competence
could reasonably be extended to other areas of exclusive or
mixed competence in external relations, such as
development policy, humanitarian assistance, management
of external financial programmes and enlargement
negotiations; in these areas the High Representative would
play an important coordination role.9 The advantage of this
approach is that it would be easier to manage and, given
its relatively small size, less likely to evoke turf tussles
amongst the institutions, or concern from some Member
States regarding the potential effects upon their national
diplomatic services and practices. It would, however, be
insufficient to staff the full range of geographic and thematic
desks, quite aside from the basic staffing of the Union
delegations. The preferences of the Member States were
torn between those who wanted the EEAS restricted to CFSP
issues, while others preferred an even broader remit than
that described above, to include areas such as enlargement,
neighbourhood (ENP) and development policy.10
As has already been suggested, the maximalist model
would include a far wider representation from the
Commission side to include all or most of the DGs mentioned
above (except trade). The Joint Progress Report by Solana
and Barroso, referred to above, argued that the roles
attributed to the High Representative (including, notably,
responsibility for consistency of the external relations of the
Union) mean that the EEAS should be in a position to
“provide unified policy advice and briefing not only to the
[High Representative], but also to the other Commissioners
and the President of the European Council”.11 The same
report suggested that the Service should include “services
currently dealing with CFSP (including CSDP), together with
geographical desks covering all regions of the world and
thematic desks dealing with issues such as human rights,
counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and relations with the
UN”.12 The report is careful to note that desks should not be
duplicated, but this dodges the question of whether existing
desks should be relocated to the EEAS or not?
On the Council Secretariat side involvement could
extend to all crisis management-related aspects, including
the Military Staff, as well as the Sitcen. It is worth noting in
passing that the minimalist
model would have the effect
of bifurcating the civilian and
military aspects of crisis
management, if the Military
Staff were excluded from the
Service. The maximalist
perspective would therefore
incorporate the military
dimensions of crisis manage-
ment into the EEAS which, it
could be argued, is logical
given the High Represent-
ative’s responsibilities in the
CSDP domain. The model
could give rise to questions
of manageability for the High
Representative and the type
of management structures and style that would be required
to deal with the Service and coordination with the
Commission, Council Secretariat and the Member States.
Finally, the maximalist model may bring up the question of
how to improve relations between the European Parliament
and the EEAS and whether there is need to expand upon
Michael Matthiessen’s current role as Personal
Representative of the High Representative for Parliamentary
Affairs in the CFSP area, into a fully-fledged section
responsible for relations with the Parliament.
No matter which model prevails (the former seems
more likely) there will still be a number of vexatious issues.
Four deserve brief mention. First, the question of staffing
ratios may prove challenging. Commission officials in the
famille Relex outnumber their Council Secretariat
counterparts by a ratio of almost 5:1.13 The presence of
national diplomats may alter the ratio slightly but, in both
the minimalist (as service providers) or the maximalist (as
the predominant staff component) cases, the Commission’s
role in shaping and staffing the Service will be significant.
This may also have implications for the financing of the
Service.
Second, the question of whether the Situation Centre
(SitCen) will be within the EEAS remains highly sensitive.
The current reservations that apply to the sharing of
intelligence analysis beyond the Member States may be an
a priori argument for excluding the SitCen, but this could
then harm the ability of the Service to respond in an optimal
manner, especially since crisis prevention remains a fixed
priority under the treaty.
Third, the budgetary arrangements for the Service
remain unclear. If the EEAS is financed from the general
budget this will give the European Parliament considerable
leverage (a point noted in the Convention), whereas if it is
financed through a separate intergovernmental
arrangement the question of who should pay for what, at
a time when nearly every national foreign ministry faces
budget strictures, will come to the fore. In the event of the
latter, this could tip the balance in favour of the minimalist
option.
The final sensitive question is how the Member States fit
into the EEAS. Two declarations on CFSP inserted into the
Final Act strike a potentially defensive note on the part of the
Member States vis-à-vis the putative Service.14 The first
notes that the provisions on CFSP, including the creation of
the office of High Representative and the establishment of
the External Service, will not “affect the responsibilities of
the Member States, as they
currently exist, for the
formulation and conduct of
their foreign policy nor of
their national representation
in third countries and
international organiza-
tions”. In a similar vein the
second declaration notes
that the same developments
will “not affect the existing
legal basis, responsibilities,
and powers of each Member
State in relation to the
formulation and conduct of
its foreign policy, its national
diplomatic service, relations
with third countries and
participation in international organisations, including a
Member State’s membership of the Security Council of the
United Nations”.
The manner in which personnel from the Member States
are supplied to the Service is open for discussion (temporary
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Perception of the EEAS from
the Member States and the
decisions that are made
regarding the quantity and
level of secondment to the
EEAS, will have a strong
influence on the shaping of
the Service.
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agents or seconded?), as is the question of how all staff in
the EEAS can be accorded the same status and conditions
of employment. The selection procedure for national staff
working in the Service and who has the final right of
approval also remains up in the air. The perception of the
EEAS from the Member States, and the decisions that are
made regarding the quantity and level of secondment to
the EEAS, will have a strong influence on the shaping of the
Service. The quality of existing national staff in the Council
Secretariat leaves room for optimism, but if the EEAS is
perceived to be Commission-oriented or dominated (see
the above point on potential staffing ratios), it may evoke
more caution on the part of
the Member States.
If the Member States were
to choose to see the EEAS as
an opportunity, rather than
a potential threat to the
conduct of foreign policy or
representation, their role
could be substantial, espe-
cially if senior national figures serve in the Service (as was
the idea behind the appointment of the former Irish Prime
Minister, John Bruton, to the Head of Delegation in
Washington DC). The EEAS offers an opportunity for closer
coordination between the Member States and the EU,
compared to the vagaries of coordination in the current
Commission and rotating Presidency contexts. The EEAS
could also be usefully promoted as a platform for horizontal
coordination in the growing number of issues that go
beyond the ambit of any one Member State. The presence
of national embassies (especially those of the larger Member
States) in many overseas locations, as well as EU delegations,
raises the question of whether such representation is
duplicative or whether the EEAS might usefully concentrate
on regional perspectives and issues, in the same manner
that a number of Special Representatives are doing.
Union delegations Union delegations Union delegations Union delegations Union delegations
The Lisbon Treaty, due to the attribution of legal personality
to the EU, refers to Union delegations.15 There was originally
no defined position on whether the delegations should
form part of the EEAS or not but, logically, it is assumed that
they should. This does not imply, however, that the EEAS
should entirely staff the delegations. The treaty states that,
“With the exception of the common foreign and security
policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties, [the
Commission] shall ensure the Union’s external
representation”.16 The Union delegations will presumably
build upon the current External Service and will include staff
from other DGs, such as trade, agriculture or transport, to
provide seconded expertise; this is similar to many national
models where professional diplomats are complemented
by the line ministries. For the CFSP-specific aspects, Council
Secretariat or seconded national staff will have to be
included. The Treaty instructs national diplomatic and
consular missions to work in “close cooperation” with the
delegations.17
The composition of the delegations raises a number of
issues, starting with the question of authority. Presumably,
the staff of a given delegation will fall under the Head of
delegation which implies that all staff, regardless of origin,
should be part of a single structure. The integration of
national staff into the delegations raises questions regarding
the exchange of information and liaison arrangements
between the delegations and the missions of the Member
States in third countries. A broader question, broached by
Michel Barnier, former French Foreign Minister and former
Commissioner, concerns the ill-defined links between
consular and diplomatic protection and areas such as civil
protection, crisis intervention and humanitarian assistance.18
The Charter of Fundamental Rights also defines the right to
consular and diplomatic protection as a “fundamental
right” of the EU citizen. This may suggest a greater EU role
in this area but for less noble reasons, such as the financial
restrictions confronting many national diplomatic services,
there may be national
interests in moving some
consular and visa duties
towards the EEAS.
The Treaty is clear that
“The diplomatic missions of
the Member States and the
Union delegations in third
countries and at inter-
national organisations shall cooperate and shall contribute
to formulating and implementing the common approach
[defined by the European Council or the Council]”19 and
that the Union delegations “shall act in close cooperation
with the Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions”.20
The spirit of mutual cooperation that will be required is not
evident if read in conjunction with the two declarations on
CFSP attached to the Final Act (see above). The evident
danger of not striking the right cooperative balance is that
the national diplomatic staff will view temporary assignment
or secondment to the EU as a burden, with the consequence
that the game becomes one of shifting burdens (notably
consular) in the direction of the delegations and
downgrading the prestige of service in the EEAS amongst
national diplomats. Finally, the pressure from the Member
States to replicate national diplomatic models at the
European level should be resisted since the EEAS offers the
chance to design from scratch far more integrated horizontal
structures that can address complex interlinked challenges
– ranging from terrorism, health issues, security sector
reform to migration – in ways that many national diplomatic
services find difficult to do.
The Common Security and Defence Policy The Common Security and Defence Policy The Common Security and Defence Policy The Common Security and Defence Policy The Common Security and Defence Policy
The renamed ESDP – C C C C CSDP in the Treaty – reflects a number
of changes that, for the most part, codify existing practice.
For instance, the idea of “coalitions of the willing” and lead
framework nations is already fairly well established, but is
codified in the form of permanent structured cooperation.
The expanded Petersberg tasks also codify what the EU has
been doing anyway and the 2004 Solidarity Clause, adopted
by the European Council in the aftermath of the Madrid
bombings, are now in the Treaty. Two things are worthy of
note, however.
First, the appearance of the mutual defence clause21
appears to open up the possibility for an “Article 5” type
NATO (or WEU) obligation. The relevant section states that,
“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an
obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter”. The clause is however circumscribed by reference
to the “specific character of the security and defence policy
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ahead, beyond the
ratification of the treaty.
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of certain Member States”. It is therefore clear that, while
some may welcome the presence of a mutual defence
clause, its practical impact is limited by the neutrality or
non-alignment of some EU members on the one hand, and
by a preference to see such obligations fulfilled through
NATO on the other.
The second notable aspect of the stipulations on CSDP
is the considerable emphasis placed on the role of the
European Defence Agency (EDA). The multiple mentions of
the EDA is remarkable given that only two other agencies
(the European Space Agency and Euratom’s Supply Agency)
are actually mentioned by name (see Article 45 in particular).
Large parts of the 2004 Joint Action founding the EDA are
reproduced in the treaty. The purpose is, presumably, to
accord particular importance to the role of the Agency as
a vehicle for helping to address the underlying rhetoric-
resources gap at the centre of CSDP. This is clearly a high-
stakes move when considering the relative newness of the
agency and its limited powers to influence European
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defence procurement, budgeting and innovation. The
agency has enjoyed some early successes, but the longer-
term challenges are formidable.
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
The test for the future coherence and credibility of EU
external relations depends upon the political will of the
Member States to breathe life into the new institutions and
practices created by the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty does
not put national diplomatic practice up against European-
level diplomacy but offers potential synergy through mutual
involvement and enrichment. The question of whether the
treaty is allowed to live up to its potential will depend
critically upon the EEAS since it is difficult to conceive of an
effective High Representative, streamlined geographical or
thematic desks, let alone fully-fledged Union delegations,
if the Service is deprived of oxygen upon delivery. The real
challenges lie ahead, beyond the ratification of the Treaty.
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